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What Is a Mechanism?
A Counterfactual Account
Jim Woodward†‡
California Institute of Technology
This paper presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms
consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant
under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle
to change the behavior of one part independently of the others. Each of these features
can be captured by the truth of certain counterfactuals.
1. Introduction. My co-symposiasts, Lindley Darden and Stuart Glennan,
argue that the construction of explanations and the identification of causal
relationships is closely bound up with the discovery of mechanisms. I fully
agree. In what follows I will try to show how ideas that I have recently
defended linking causal and explanatory relationships to relationships that
are invariant under interventions can also be used to provide a character-
ization of the notion of a mechanism.
What is a mechanism? In a recent paper, Machamer, Darden, and
Craver (hereafter MDC) write:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termi-
nation conditions. (2000, 3)
Elsewhere they write that descriptions of mechanisms are explanatory in
virtue of revealing “productive relations,” and that rendering phenomena
within a given area “intelligible” has to do with “portraying mechanisms
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in terms of a field’s bottom out [ that is, fundamental] entities and activ-
ities” (2000, 3). For example, bottom out activities in molecular biology
and molecular neurobiology fall into the following four categories:
geometrical-mechanical, electro-chemical, energetic, and electro-magnetic.
While this is unexceptionable as far as it goes, I think that it is worth
exploring whether it is possible to provide a more general and less discipline
specific characterization of notions like “mechanism” and “production.”
2. A Physical Example. It will be useful to begin with a concrete example.
Consider (Ex1) a block sliding down an inclined plane. The standard text-
book analysis proceeds as follows. The block is subject to two forces—a
gravitational force due to the weight of the block and a force due to fric-
tion which opposes the motion of the block. The frictional force Fk obeys
the relationship
Fk  lk N (1)
where lk is the coefficient of kinetic friction and N is the normal force
exerted perpendicular to the direction of motion of the block. From the
above diagram, we have that the component of the gravitational force due
to the weight of the block along the plane is mg sin ø. The normal force
N mg cos ø and so the frictional force Fk lk mg cos ø. The net force
on the block along the plane is thus
Fnet  mg sin ø mg cos ø (2)
and the acceleration a of the block is given by
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a g sin ø g cos ø. (3)
Although this is a particularly simple example, it exhibits a number of
features possessed by more interesting and complex mechanisms. The first
point to notice is that like other mechanisms, this one is made up of parts
or components that, as MDC say, are “productive of regular changes.”
What does this mean? It is a familiar point that not every generalization
describing a regularity describes a productive or causal relationship. Even
though there is a correlation or regular association between the joint
effects of a common cause, neither of these effects produce regular changes
in the other—a point that is illustrated by the familiar example of the
correlation between the reading of a barometer B and the occurrence/
non-occurrence of a storm S produced by atmospheric pressure A. Some
basis must be found for excluding such non causal regularities. A favorite
strategy of philosophers for accomplishing this appeals to the notion of
“law.” This is the strategy followed by Glennan (1996, 52), who charac-
terizes mechanisms as follows: “A mechanism underlying a behavior is a
complex system which produces that behavior by . . . the interaction of a
number of parts according to direct causal laws.” According to Glennan,
the correlation between B and S is not a productive relationship because
it is not a “direct causal law”; by contrast, relationships like (1) or, to use
Glennan’s example, the generalizations governing the interactions between
the parts of a coke machine are “laws,” albeit laws that are only “locally
applicable” (1996, 15).
Like MDC, and in contrast to Glennan, I think that the notion of law
is of very limited usefulness in characterizing the operation of most mech-
anisms. There is a major mismatch between the features that philosophers
have thought laws must possess and the generalizations that characterize
the operation of many mechanisms. Generalizations like Maxwell’s equa-
tions and the field equations of General Relativity are paradigmatic laws;
whatever else laws are, they are presumably generalizations that are rele-
vantly similar to these paradigms. Laws are also commonly taken to be
generalizations of wide scope that apply to many different kinds of systems
and to have few or no (or at least a clearly delimitable set of) exceptions.
In the above example, although the generalization F mg that describes
the acceleration of a falling body is sometimes described as a law (the law
of falling bodies), it lacks many of these features—it holds only approxi-
mately, even near the surface of the earth, and fails to hold even approx-
imately at sufficiently large distances from the surface of the earth. It is
obviously contingent on the earth having the particular mass and radius
that it does. Generalization (1) is, if anything a less appealing candidate
for a law. The textbook from which this example comes goes out of its
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1. See Woodward 2000.
way not to describe (1) as a law, but instead describes it as a non-
fundamental and only approximate “empirical relationship” (Frautshi
1986, 179ff). The particular value of the coefficient of kinetic friction be-
tween a pair of surfaces is the net result of a large number of extremely
complicated contact forces and depends, in ways that are still not well
understood from the perspective of fundamental theory, on the detailed
characteristics of the two surfaces and will change if the characteristics of
those surfaces are altered. Thus, even if (1) correctly describes the fric-
tional force on the block for some particular experimental set up, we could
easily disrupt that generalization by, for example, greasing the surface of
the plane or abrading it with sand paper. This is very different from the
behavior of paradigmatic laws. A similar point holds for many other com-
ponents of simple mechanical systems—springs, pulleys, gears and the
like. The linear relationship between the extension and restoring force
exerted by a spring depends on features that are highly specific to that sort
of spring and will break down under sufficiently large extensions or other
processes that deform the spring, the relationship between the movement
of one gear and another will hold only so long as the gears remain rela-
tively rigid bodies, and so on.
It is true enough that generalizations like (1) do possess at least one
feature traditionally ascribed to laws: they support (some) counterfac-
tuals—e. g., counterfactuals about how the frictional force will change if
the normal force changes, as long as the experimental system is not dis-
turbed by activities like greasing. However, without some further analysis
of “what support for counterfactuals” means, this feature does not distin-
guish (1) from non-causal generalizations. The correlation between B and
S also “supports counterfactuals,” under one natural interpretation of that
phrase: the counterfactuals “if the barometer reading is falling/ rising, the
storm will /will not (or is more likely/less likely to occur)” are true, again
so long as the system is undisturbed. What we would like is an analysis
that gives us some insight into why one can appeal to generalization (1)
but not the correlation between B and S in explaining the operation of a
mechanism. Merely deciding to call the first but not the second a law does
not help with this issue.
3. Interventions and Invariance. These remarks are intended to set the stage
for the positive analysis that I favor. I will not repeat all of the details of
that analysis here, since these are available elsewhere1 but I will instead
focus specifically on what my account implies for the understanding of
mechanisms. First, what counts as regular “productive” behavior in a part
or component of a mechanism? I understand this in terms of the notion
 S370
of invariance under interventions. Suppose that X and Y are variables
that can take at least two values. The notion of an intervention attempts
to capture, in non-anthropomorphic language that makes no reference to
notions like human agency, the conditions that would need to be met in
an ideal experimental manipulation of X performed for the purpose of
determining whether X causes Y. The intuitive idea is that an intervention
on X with respect to Y is a change in the value of X that changes Y, if at
all, only via a route that goes through X and not in some other way. This
requires, among other things, that the intervention not be correlated with
other causes of Y except for those causes of Y (if any) that are causally
between X and Y and that the intervention not affect Y independently of
X. Thus if A is a common cause of B and S as in the example above,
manipulating B by manipulating A will not count as an intervention on
B with respect to S since in this case the manipulation affects S via a route
(the route that connects A to S ) that does not go through B.
By contrast, if we were to employ a random number generator and,
depending on its output, set the value of B at a high or low reading, in a
way that is causally and probabilistically independent of the value of A,
this would constitute an intervention on B with respect to S. What we
expect of course is that the correlation between B and S would disappear
if this intervention were to be performed repeatedly, which is to say that
this correlation is not invariant under this intervention. Indeed, a mo-
ment’s thought will show that the correlation between B and S is not
invariant under any interventions on B. On the account that I favor, if a
generalization G relating X to Y is to describe a causal relationship (or in
MDC’s language) a “productive” relationship, it must be invariant under
at least some (but not necessarily all) interventions on X in the sense that
G should continue to hold (or to hold approximately) under such inter-
ventions. The relationships described above meet this condition—for ex-
ample, the relationship (1) will be invariant under at least a certain range
of interventions that change the value of N—for some such changes, lk
will be (at least approximately) a constant that is independent of N and
hence (1) will correctly describe how Fk will change under this intervention.
Similarly, the relationship Fmg sin ø will continue to correctly describe
how the component of the weight of the block directed along the plane
will change under interventions that change the value of ø and of m.
When a relationship is invariant under at least some interventions, it is
potentially usable for purposes of manipulation and control—potentially
usable in the sense that while it may not as a matter of fact be possible to
carry out an intervention on X, it is nonetheless true that if an intervention
on X were to occur, this would be a way of manipulating or controlling
the value of Y. Thus, in the above examples, we may control the value of
Fk by controlling the value of N, we may manipulate the restoring force
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exerted by a spring by manipulating its extension, and we may manipulate
the component of the gravitational force on the block directed along the
plane by manipulating m and ø. By contrast, one cannot manipulate
whether a storm occurs by altering the position of a barometer dial.
This account seems to me to capture what is correct in the traditional
idea that causal relationships, in contrast to non-causal relationships, sup-
port counterfactuals. What is distinctive about a generalization like (1) is
that it supports counterfactuals of a special sort—counterfactuals that
describe changes that will occur under interventions. The generalization
describing the correlation between B and S may support other sorts of
counterfactuals, but it does not support such interventionist counterfac-
tuals. It is interventionist counterfactuals that tell us about the distinctive
patterns of counterfactual dependence that are associated with manipu-
lation and control.
The notion of invariance under interventions is intended to do the work
(the work of distinguishing between causal and accidental generalizations)
that is accomplished by the notion of law in accounts like Glennan’s. As
the above examples illustrate, whether or not a generalization is invariant
is surprisingly independent of whether it satisfies many of the traditional
criteria for lawfulness. For example, a generalization may be invariant
(over some range of interventions and other sorts of changes) even though
it holds only over a limited spatio-temporal interval or has exceptions or
narrow scope or is not integrated into some larger body of theory. This is
in large measure a consequence of the way in which invariance is defined:
for a generalization to be invariant all that it is required is that it be stable
under some changes and interventions. It is not required that it be invar-
iant under all possible changes and interventions. Thus the generalization
(1) describing the relationship between frictional and normal force is in-
variant as long as it would continue to hold under some interventions that
change the value of N. Its invariance is not undermined by the fact that
there are other interventions on N (for example, increasing N to a very
large value) or other sorts of changes ( greasing the contact surface) under
which (1) would break down. Invariance thus has the virtue of capturing
the idea that what really matters to whether a generalization describes a
causal relationship is whether it describes a relationship that is potentially
exploitable for purposes of manipulation and not whether it has the other
features (wide scope etc.) traditionally assigned to laws. By contrast, some-
one who wishes to characterize (1) as a “law” is in the dialectically awk-
ward position of needing to explain why that characterization is appro-
priate, even though (1) has exceptions, narrow scope, is not really well
integrated with fundamental theory and so on.
4. Production and Counterfactual Dependence. My examples so far have
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involved simple physical systems. I turn now to a biological example which
is designed to bring out the differences between the counterfactual account
that I favor and a second approach that may seem attractive. This second
approach attempts to look for some empirical feature or disjunction of
features that underlies all cases of causal production. One candidate for
this feature, emphasized in recent work by Wesley Salmon and by Phil
Dowe is the transfer of some conserved quantity such as energy and mo-
mentum, perhaps in conformity with some continuity constraint. It may
be that the list of “bottom out” activities in molecular biology proposed
by MDC is advanced in a similar spirit—that their intent is to characterize
empirically the notion of a “productive” interaction in molecular biology
by providing a list of fundamental activities that count as productive.
Consider the lac operon model for E. coli due to Jacob and Monod.
When lactose is present in its environment, E. coli produces enzymes that
metabolize it. What is the mechanism that determines whether these
enzymes are produced? According to the model proposed by Jacob and
Monod, there are three structural genes that code for these enzymes as
well as an operator region that controls the access of RNA polymerase to
the structural genes. In the absence of lactose, a regulatory gene is active
which produces a repressor protein which binds to the operator for the
structural genes, thus preventing transcription. In the presence of lactose,
allolactose, an isomer formed from lactose, binds to the repressor, inac-
tivating it and thereby preventing it from repressing the operator, so that
transcription proceeds. Biologists describe this as a case of “negative con-
trol.” Unlike positive control in which, as the text I consulted puts it, “an
inducer interacts directly with the genome to switch transcription on”
(Griffiths 1996, 550) the inducer in this case, allolactose, initiates tran-
scription by interfering with the operation of an agent that prevents tran-
scription. The example is thus an instance of what has been called “double
prevention” or “causation by disconnection” in the recent literature on
causation (Hall, forthcoming).
What is interesting about this example, as well as other examples of
double prevention, is that a causal relationship is present between the
presence of allolactose and the production of the enzymes but there is no
obvious respect in which there is transfer of energy from the former to the
latter. And while we can perhaps use MDC’s list of bottom out activities
to describe the productive relationships between individual steps in the
above process, it is far less obvious how to use this list to capture the idea
that there is an overall productive relationship between allolactose and
enzyme production without explicitly invoking the idea of counterfactual
dependence. To begin with, the overall relationship between allolactose
and enzyme production does not seem to fall into any of the categories
on MDC’s list. Nor is it plausible to claim that the overall relationship
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2. This claim is not plausible because causation (and production) are not transitive.
Standard counterexamples to the transitivity of causation, such as the dogbite example
in McDermott 1995, are also counterexamples to the proposal in the text.
between X and Y is productive if X is connected to Y via a series of
intermediate steps each of which correspond to an activity on MDC’s list.2
It also seems to me that the relationship between the presence of lactose
and enzyme production as well as the relationship governing the inter-
mediate steps of this process are too local and too susceptible to exceptions
to count as plausible candidates for laws.
Nonetheless these relationships satisfy the condition described above
for a relationship to be causal or productive: they are stable under some
range of interventions. For example, the relationship between the presence
of lactose and enzyme production is stable under interventions that change
whether lactose is present, the relationship between the repressor protein
and the operator is stable under interventions that change whether the
repressor is present, and so on. These are also relationships that are po-
tentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control—one can
use them to manipulate whether enzymes are produced, whether the op-
erator is repressed, and so on. In cases like this, a counterfactual theory
of the sort outlined above seems to do a better job of capturing what
production means than either a transfer of energy theory, a list of pro-
ductive activities, or a law-based theory.
This idea that in molecular biology theories that describe causal or
explanatory relationships or mechanisms provide information that is po-
tentially relevant to manipulation or control is not just my conceit; it is
explicitly endorsed by molecular biologists. A typical statement can be
found in Robert Weinberg’s (1985) discussion. He tells us that “[b]iology
has traditionally been a descriptive science” but that because of recent
advances, particularly in instrumentation and experimental technique, it
is now appropriate to think of molecular biology as providing “explana-
tions” and identifying “causal mechanisms.” What does this contrast be-
tween description and the identification of causal mechanisms consist of?
Weinberg explicitly links the ability of molecular biology to identify causal
mechanisms with the fact that it provides information of a sort that could
in principle be used for purposes of manipulation and control. According
to Weinberg, biology is now an explanatory science because we have dis-
covered theories and experimental techniques that provide information
about how to intervene in and manipulate biological systems. Earlier bio-
logical theories—for example, traditional systems of classification of
plants and animals—fail to provide such information and for this reason
are merely descriptive. As Weinberg puts it, molecular biologist correctly
think that “the invisible submicroscopic agents they study can explain, at
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3. For additional discussion of modularity in the context of systems of structural equa-
tions, see Woodward 1999.
one essential level the complexity of life,” because by manipulating those
agents it is now “possible to change critical elements of the biological
blueprint at will.” (1985, 48, my emphasis). This account of the difference
between descriptive and causal theories is essentially the view that I have
defended above.
5. Modularity. So far I have been arguing that components of mechanisms
should behave in accord with regularities that are invariant under inter-
ventions and support counterfactuals about what would happen in hy-
pothetical experiments. However, I have said little about what a compo-
nent is. The basic idea that I want to defend is that the components of a
mechanism should be independent in the sense that it should be possible
in principle to intervene to change or interfere with the behavior of one
component without necessarily interfering with the behavior of others. As
before, what is crucial is not whether such interventions can be carried
out, as a practical matter, but rather whether this condition of independent
changeability would be met if it were possible to carry out appropriate
interventions on individual components. I will say that a system having
this feature is modular.3 Thus, if we imagine a machine consisting of com-
ponents C1.. Cn and some process that changes the behavior of C1, then if
the system is modular and we know what the new behavior of the changed
component C1 is, we can combine this with the generalizations governing
the other components, which remain unchanged, to determine what the
new overall behavior will be. This sort of independence of the various
components allows one to trace out the consequences of possible changes
in any of them for the overall behavior of the system. By contrast, if any
change in (what seems to be) the generalization governing the behavior of
one component automatically brings with it changes in the generalizations
governing the behavior of (what we believe to be) other components, this
is an indication that our proposed decomposition of the mechanism into
parts or stages is incorrect.
As an illustration, return to (Ex1). As remarked above, it is natural to
think of this machine as composed of two different components—a com-
ponent force due to gravity directed down the incline of the plane and a
force due to friction that resists the motion of the block. Applied to this
example, modularity says that if these components are genuinely distinct,
the relationships governing each should be independently changeable—
that is, it should be possible to change the relationship or generalization
governing the gravitational component without changing the relationship
governing the frictional force and vice -versa. In fact, this is what we do
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find. We can change the relationship (1) by altering the characteristics of
the contact surface between the block and the plane—e.g., by greasing it.
This will change the coefficient of kinetic friction, but will not alter the
generalization governing the gravitational force component at all. On the
other hand, we could in principle alter the latter relationship by moving
the inclined plane to a weaker gravitational field, which would result in a
different value g’ for the acceleration due to gravity. This would also
change the value of N, the normal force exerted by the block, but it should
not alter the relationship (1) between the frictional force and N. My sug-
gestion is that at least part of what it means to say that we have identified
the mechanism responsible for the overall motion of the block and that
we have correctly segregated that mechanism into components is that we
have exhibited that motion as the consequence of components that are
independently changeable in the way just described. Obviously, once we
have done this, we have the resources for answering a range of questions
about how the motion of the block would have been different under
changes in the inputs to these various components, as well as changes in
the components themselves.
This idea yields the following proposal:
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an accept-
able model of a mechanism is that the representation (i) describe
an organized or structured set of parts or components, where
(ii) the behavior of each component is described by a generaliza-
tion that is invariant under interventions, and where (iii) the gen-
eralizations governing each component are also independently
changeable, and where (iv) the representation allows us to see
how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and (iii), the overall output of the mech-
anism will vary under manipulation of the input to each compo-
nent and changes in the components themselves.
My notion of modularity is closely connected to what Darden calls in
her paper “modular subassembly” Recall that this is a strategy for mech-
anism discovery that proceeds by “hypothesiz[ing] that a mechanism con-
sists of known modules or types of modules. One cobbles together differ-
ent modules to construct a hypothesized mechanism” (Darden 2002). If
this strategy is to work, it must be possible to add a new module or com-
ponent to a structure consisting of other modules or to replace one module
with another without disrupting or changing the other modules in the
structure. This is just another way of expressing the idea that modules or
components should be independently changeable. For example, in (Ex1)
if we were to add an additional component consisting of a rope connecting
a second weight to the sliding block via a pulley, this will result in an
additional force on the block but it should not alter the previous two force
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components due to friction and the gravitational force on the block or the
relationships (1) and (2) governing these. It is this that allows us to “cobble
together” the original analysis of (Ex1) with the additional force compo-
nent to produce an account of the new mechanism.
A similar modularity constraint holds for the biological example dis-
cussed above. In the case of the lac operon, the wild type gene I that
produces the repressor protein can be replaced with a mutant form of the
gene I that does not produce the repressor. As expected, cells containing
only I but normal structural genes synthesize full levels of the enzymes
in both the presence and the absence of an inducer. This is expected be-
cause, in accordance with modularity, it is assumed that this way of chang-
ing the repressor gene from I to I does not affect the generalizations
describing the operation of the structural genes, although it does of course
cause the structural genes to be continually “on.” If cells contain both I
and a mutant form Z of the structural gene that in its unmutated form
(Z) synthesizes B-galactosidase, they will not produce this enzyme. If
an IZ chromosome fragment is then introduced, recipient cells syn-
thesize B-galactosidase for a period and then stop. The obvious interpre-
tation is that this occurs because by the end of this period enough repressor
product has been produced by the I genes to block further synthesis.
We thus see how the operon model in effect encodes a set of predictions
about what will happen in various hypothetical experiments—experiments
in which different components of the model: the repressor protein, the
various structural genes, and so on—are manipulated independently of
each other. If instead some other model of the mechanism was correct—
if lactose induced enzyme synthesis by directly interacting with the struc-
tural genes (“positive control”)—then we would expect a different pattern
of outcomes in these experiments. For example, we would not expect syn-
thesis to occur in the presence of I regardless of whether the inducer is
present. An important part, then, of what it means to say that the operon
model is a correct account of this mechanism and that it correctly describes
the productive relationships at work in the mechanism is that it correctly
predicts the results of these hypothetical experiments.
6. Conclusion. I believe that a notion of mechanism very similar to that
characterized by MECH is employed in many other areas of science—for
example, in psychology, where it is generally agreed that explaining the
behavior of complex systems should proceed by decomposition into parts
or modules each exhibiting a characteristic stable input/out relationship
and where it is often explicitly assumed that the criterion for being a mod-
ule or a part is that distinct parts must be “separately modifiable’” (Stein-
berg 1998, 706). However, while I will not try to argue for this thesis here,
I believe that in contrast to the situation in mechanics and molecular bi-
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ology, where purported mechanisms often do satisfy the conditions in
MECH, there is frequently much less evidence that this is true in psy-
chology. In psychology MECH has a real normative bite—in particular,
the standard boxological diagrams allegedly describing the operation of
psychological mechanisms drawn by psychologists are rarely accompanied
by convincing evidence that the parts corresponding to the boxes satisfy
the modularity condition described above. If the argument of this paper
is correct, this is a reason for being skeptical that these diagrams describe
genuine mechanisms.
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